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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT BETTE VJYCALIS 
( 8 6 0 1 7 2 ) 
Preliminary Matters 
Prior to replying to Respondents Guardian Title Company of 
Utah and Warren H. Curliss, its President, (hereinafter 
"Guardian") arguments on the merits, Appellant Bette Wycalis 
(hereinafter "Wycalis") would like to address three preliminary 
matters. 
A. "Reversal" 
Guardian asserts that Wycalis asked this court to find 
liability on the part of Guardian as a matter of law 
(Guardian's Brief page 13); and, as a consequence of this 
"extraordinary" relief (Guardian's Brief page 7) Wycalis must 
carry a heavier burden tnan would be required in the more 
1 
Case No.s 860172 and 860156 
Priority No. 13b 
"routine case" (Guardian's Brief pa9e 13). In this instance, 
and m other arguments throughout its Brief, Guardian is 
endeavoring to confuse the issue before this court. That 
Guardian's argument with respect to the "reversal" question is 
incorrect and erroneous is easily demonstrated. 
Guardian urges that it is Wycalis' position that this court 
should hold Guardian liable as a matter of law. (Guardian's 
Brief page 7, 112.) Clearly, Wycalis has not requested such 
relief (Wycalis1 Brief page 31) and would not be entitled to 
such relief since Wycalis did not file a Cross Motion for 
Summary Judgment and did not request a ruling on her Motion for 
Summary Judgment dated February 21, 1985. (R. 219.) 
Guardian's characterization of Wycalis' position is completely 
erroneous and is the first of many instances m which Guardian 
endeavors to confuse the issues before this court. 
B. "Prooer" Acknowledcenent, Utah Code Anne. §57-2*1 et seq. 
Guardian has asserted for the first tine on this appeal 
tnat the request for reconveyance in this case was "properly 
acknowledged*. (Guardian's Brief page 1G, Tl.) This assertion 
is contrary to tne facts of record and Utah statute. 
It has Deen assumed DV Guardian tnat tne request for 
reconveyance in this matter was a forgery. (Guardian's Brief 
page 11, T3.) Guardian now asserts for the first time on 
appeal tnat the acknowledgement was "proper!} acKnowledgec" 
pursuant to Utah Code Anno. §57*2*1 et seq. (Guardian's Brief 
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page 10, 111.) Since this is the first time this defense has 
been raised, it may not be properly addressed on appeal. 
(Turtle Management Inc. v, Haggis Management Inc., 645 P.2d 
667, Utah 1982.) Further, since whether the acknowledgment is 
properly acknowledged pertains to the issue of forgery; that 
is, if the acknowledgement is proper, the signature of Wycalis 
was not a forgery, it follows that the assertion of proper 
acknowledgment is contradictory to the assumption of forgery. 
Secondly, the signatures on the request are not properly 
acknowledged under the statute. The statute sets forth the 
form of acknowledgement which must be used if the grantor is 
unknown to the notary. (Utah Code Anno. §57*2*8.) This 
section provides a specific form which was not used on the 
request for reconveyance. The form under §57-2*8 is the only 
acknowledgement form which would have been appropriate since 
the notary did not know the signers of the note. (Wycalis 
Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment, Statement of Fact 
#20.) Since the acknowledgement form required by this section 
was not used, the request was not properly acknowledged. 
Further, §57*2^12 provides as follows: 
No certificate of such proof shall be made unless such 
subscribing witness shall prove that the person whose name 
is subscribed thereto as a party is the person described 
m , and who executed, the same; that such person executed 
the conveyance, and that such person subscribed his name 
thereto as a witness thereof at the request of the maker of 
such instrument. 
Clearly, since Guardian assumes the request to be a 
3 
forgery, the requirements of this statutory provision cannot be 
satisfied. Hence, the request is not properly acknowledged 
under the statute. 
C. Citation to Authority 
Finally, it should be noted that Guardian has raised much 
clamor in asserting that Wycalis, on this appeal, has "wholly 
failed" to support her position with applicable legal 
authority. (E.g. Guardian's Brief page 24, 1(2; "None of the 
plaintiff's legal authorities even come close to dealing with 
the issue before this court.") Uycalis directs the court's 
attention to the fact that Wycalis has supported her position 
with approximately two dozen cases from varying jurisdictions, 
as well as an extensive annotation m the American Law Reports 
(90 ALR2d 495), all of which deal squarely with the issue of 
fiduciary relations between a trustee and a beneficiary under a 
deed of trust and, more specifically, with unauthorized 
reconveyances. 
In contrast, Guardian has argued that this Court should 
render its decision in this case, a case of first impression in 
this state, based upon a single case, decided by this Court, 
involving third party negligence in a claim for wrongful death 
in a murder committed by a stranger. The contrast in positions 
could not be more striking. It is Wycalis' position that this 
Court should decide this case, which is of fundamental 
importance to the financial community of this state, based upon 
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the law applicable to fiduciaries under deeds of trust, not the 
law applicable to strangers and wrongful death. 
ARGUMENT 
Viewed in its totality, it is Guardian's position: 1) that 
trustees owe no duty to beneficiaries under the Utah trust deed 
statute which requires satisfaction of the debt prior to 
reconveyance; 2) that Guardian owes no duty to the beneficiary 
by reason of the language of the request for reconveyance which 
requires delivery of the promissory note and trust deed to the 
trustee prior to reconveyance; 3) that any duty which the 
trustee owed in this case was satisfied by Guardian in relying 
upon a forged, purportedly acknowledged (not "properly" 
acknowledged) request for reconveyance; and, 4) the trustee was 
not negligent in reconveying, unless it had reason to believe 
the request was forged because of the indicia of trustworthy 
ness which attaches to acknowledgments. Wycalis addresses 
those issues in that order. 
POINT I 
GUARDIAN OWES A DUTY TO WYCALIS UNDER UTAH CODE 
ANNO. §57-1-33 (1953) 
Cross Reference: 
Wycalis1 Brief, Point I, pages 10 A 14; 
Guardian's Brief, Point II, pages 20 * 23. 
It is Guardian's position that the following language 
imposes no duty upon a trustee to know that a beneficiary has 
been paid prior to reconveyance: "When the obligation secured 
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by any trust deed has been satisfied, the trustee shall, upon 
written request by the beneficiary, reconvey the trust 
property." (Utah Code Anno. §57<*1«33, 1953.) 
Uycalis argues that this statutory provision creates a duty 
on the part of the trustee to know that the obligation has been 
satisfied prior to reconveyance. This position is supported in 
her appellant's brief by citation to Utah case law which states 
that it is the primary responsibility of a trustee to insure 
payment of the secured debt. (Blodgett v. Marsch, 590 P.2d 
298, Utah 1978.) 
It would appear to be Guardian's position that the 
above^quoted statutory language does not create a duty upon the 
trustee because the statute is severable. That is, that 
portion of the statute which requires satisfaction of the debt 
may be disregarded by the trustee and that the trustee's only 
duty is to divest its beneficiary of the beneficiary's security 
interest. (Guardian's Brief page 22.) This position, which is 
unsupported by authority, is untenable and contradicts the 
Blodgett decision of this Court which states that the trustee's 
primary obligation is to see that the debt is paid. (Blodgett 
at 303.) 
Guardian counters by arguing that an acknowledgment has 
numerous indicia of trustworthiness, including a presumption of 
genuineness, self^authentication under the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, and that an acknowledged document is entitled to be 
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recorded at the office of the County Recorder, However, 
Guardian's reliance upon the indicia of trustworthiness ignores 
two important considerations. First, the factors cited by 
Guardian (acknowledged documents are self-authenticating, etc.) 
are only a reflection of the indicia of trustworthiness given 
the signature(s) on an acknowledged document and the only issue 
to which the trustworthiness of the signatures is relevant is 
that of payment. These factors, no matter how ingrained m 
Utah law, cannot be aggregated to overpower the fact that the 
best evidence of payment is the surrender of the note itself, 
which in this case was required by the terms of the request for 
reconveyance, but was not accomplished by Guardian. Secondly, 
the presumption of authenticity, and here the indicia of 
trustworthiness, is rebutted by a showing of clear and 
convincing evidence. (Acknowledgements §1051, 1 Am.Jur.2nd 
515.) A showing which was clearly made m this case in view of 
Guardian's assumption of forgery. 
POINT II 
ISSUES CONCERNING SURRENDER OF 
PROMISSORY NOTE AND TRUST DEED 
Cross Reference: 
Wycalis1 Brief, Point II, pages 14-17; 
Guardian's Brief, Point III.B.l. and 2., pages 25*28. 
A. This Matter is not Raised for First Time on Appeal. 
At the trial level, Wycalis advanced the theory that Guardian 
had breached the fiduciary duty owed Wycalis. (Memorandum in 
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Opposition to Summary Judgment, Points III and IV; R. 
441^446.) In support of this position, Wycalis argued numerous 
facts in support of the breach. Specifically, that Wycalis did 
not authorize the reconveyance; did not sign the request for 
reconveyance; did not authorize another to sign the request on 
her behalf; does not know who signed her name to the request; 
did not know the notary who notarized the request; that 
Guardian did not connunicate with Uycalis prior to reconveyance 
to deternme whether the note had been paid; and that Guardian 
did not require delivery of the original note and trust deed, 
but rather relied upon the notarized signature on a request for 
reconveyance. (Wycalis1 Memorandum m Opposition to Summary 
Judgment; R. 444.) 
Guardian now endeavors to nischaracterlze Wycalis1 citation 
of this fact as a "principal argunent on appeal" which was not 
raised at the trial level. Guardian further argues that since 
the "matter" was not raised at the trial level, this Court is 
precluded from addressing the same. However, consistent with 
other arguments made by Guardian, after Guardian asserts that 
Wycalis did not raise the matter at trial, Guardian immediately 
concedes that Wycalis did raise this issue at the trial level, 
but only "in one sentence" which cane "[o]ut of the blue". 
(Guardian's Brief page 25.) 
Guardian's position is flawed for two reasons. First, the 
issue of possession of the original note and trust deed was 
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argued and emphasized at the trial level. Specifically, 
Wycalis cited California authority (Huckle v. Martranga, 160 
Cal.Rptr. 177, 1979; Wycalis1 Memorandum in Opposition to 
Summary Judgment; R. 444) stating that, prior to reconveyance, 
it was incumbent upon a trustee to know that the original note 
and trust deed were not in the hands of a bona fide purchaser 
for value in order to keep the trustee from liability. Wycalis 
also argued to the trial court that the failure of the trustee 
to require delivery was factual evidence of the failure of the 
trustee to satisfy the fiduciary duty. (Wycalis Memorandum in 
Opposition to Summary Judgment; R. 444.) Secondly, Guardian is 
in error because the possession of the original note and trust 
deed is a fact of record at the trial level and is contained in 
Statement of Fact #34 of Wycalis' Memorandum in Opposition to 
Summary Judgment. (R. 438-439.) 
Finally, it is established law that only issues which are 
not raised at the trial level are precluded on appeal. (Riter 
v. Cayias, 431 P.2d 788, Utah 1967.) In this case, the issue 
of breach of fiduciary was clearly before the trial court as 
were the facts, including the fact of failure of delivery, 
relied upon and argued by Wycalis in support of that theory. 
B. Evidence concerning surrender of the note and trust 
deed. Guardian also asserts that there is "no evidence in the 
record" that surrender of the promissory note and trust deed is 
required. (Guardian's Brief page 26.) Inconsistently, 
9 
Guardian then immediately concedes that there is evidence that 
surrender is required and that this evidence is the language in 
the request which states that the promissory note and trust 
deed are delivered into the possession of the trustee. 
(Guardian's Brief page 26.) Guardian then requests this Court 
to selectively enforce the terms of the request, arguing, 
without citation to authority, that the request "imposes no 
legal duty on Guardian". That "[i]t is simply a preprinted 
form and nothing more"; that the document has no force of law 
and "is completely ineffective to impose any legal duties [sic] 
on Guardian." (Guardian's Brief page 27.) 
This position is in diametrical opposition to Guardianfs 
argument in which it asserts that as trustee, Guardian has 
completely satisfied any duty owed Wycalis by relying upon the 
request. (Guardian's Brief page 14.) The inconsistency is 
clear. At page 14 of Guardian's brief, the trustee urges that 
it is entitled to rely with impunity upon and can be kept from 
liability by virtue of that portion of the request which 
authorizes the reconveyance, but, at page 26, Guardian argues 
that the trustee can ignore that portion of the request which 
requires delivery of the note and trust deed into the 
possession of the trustee. Not inconsistently, Guardian offers 
no authority in support of either position. 
Guardian's argument is consistent, however, with its other 
unsupported arguments. For example, Guardian has urged this 
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Court hold that Utah Code Anno. §57-<l~33, which states that a 
trustee shall reconvey after the debt is satisfied, imposes 
only a duty to reconvey, and no duty to ascertain whether the 
debt has been paid. (Guardian's Brief page 22.) Taken to 
their logical conclusion, the arguments show that it Guardian's 
position that a trustee under a deed of trust simply has no 
duty at all to protect the beneficiary's interest. Such a 
position is incompatible with this Court's holding in Blodgett 
wherein the Court stated that the primary obligation of a 
trustee is to insure payment of the obligation secured. 
Guardian's position is also contrary to established law from 
other jurisdictions. Wycalis has previously directed this 
Court's attention to the case of Huckle v. Martranga, wherein 
that California court held that: "Knowing that the note has 
been paid and is not in the hands of a bona fide purchaser for 
value is, therefore, essential to keep the trustee free from 
liability." (Id. at 181, cited m Wycalis Brief page 19.) 
The fact of the possession of the note was of record before 
the trial court, the fact that Guardian failed to require 
delivery to it of the note was argued to the trial court, a 
point which is conceded by Guardian (Guardian's Brief page 25), 
and the nondelivery was asserted by Wycalis as further factual 
proof of the breach of the fiduciary duty. 
POINT III 
LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING A CONCLUSION 
OF BREACH OF THE FIDUCIARY DUTY 
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Cross Reference: 
Wycalis1 Brief pages 10 * 20; 
Guardian's Brief pages 22 - 24. 
Guardian asserts that there is no evidence of record which 
would require it to do more than it has done in the protection 
of Wycalis1 interest. (Guardian's Brief page 23.) The simple 
answer to this proposition is that Guardian executed a deed of 
reconveyance upon a forged request for reconveyance without a) 
seeking to locate the evidence of the debt; b) without 
inquiring about the location of the original deed of trust; 
and, c) without inquiring of the beneficiary concerning 
payment. Further, whether Guardian should have done more in 
protecting Wycalis' interest is a question of lav; to be decided 
by this court. The real question is what legal authority this 
court finds persuasive and what legal theory comports with 
prior Utah decisions. In this regard, Wycalis respectfully 
urges that this court should adopt that law applicable to 
fiduciaries under deeds of trust as reflected in those cases 
cited in her brief, and not the law of wrongful death and 
negligence of third parties as urged by Guardian. 
Guardian endeavors to distinguish the cases relied upon by 
Wycalis; and here Guardian's arguments exceed the bounds of 
credibility. (Guardian's Brief Point III.A.2., page 23 «* 24.) 
At pages 23 and 24 of Guardian's Brief, the trustee asserts 
that Wycalis' legal authority is distinguishable from the case 
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at bar because "... in every one of those cases the 
reconveyance ... was entirely unauthorized . ..." (Emphasis not 
added.) It must be supposed then that it is Guardian's 
position that the reconveyance in this case was "a little bit" 
authorized or "somewhat authorized". This is the logical 
equivalent of inquiring whether a court has "some jurisdiction" 
or if a woman is "a little bit pregnant". The simple fact 
which Guardian goes to great length and effort to obscure is 
that it is Guardian who has assumed that the request was a 
forgery. That being the case, for purposes of this appeal, the 
request is unauthorized and Guardian can not now be heard to 
argue that the request was in some manner authorized. 
Since the request in the case at bar was unauthorized, and 
since, even according to Guardian (Guardian's Brief page 23), 
the cases relied upon by Wycalis involve unauthorized 
reconveyances, it is the assumption of forgery, and the law 
which applies to that assumption, which should apply to the 
case at bar. 
POINT IV 
ISSUES CONCERNING THE FORESEEABILITY OF THE FORGERY 
Cross Reference: 
Wycalis' Brief, Point IV, page 22 «* 24; 
Guardian's Brief, Point IV, page 28 «4 37. 
A. Even if this court adopts the trial court's approach, 
Guardian is liable to Wycalis because Guardian was on notice by 
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reason of the nondelivery of the original note and trust deed, 
Wycalis has addressed Guardian's principal arguments 
concerning the duty to foresee a criminal act m her brief at 
Point V. (Wycalis1 Brief page 22 - 24.) Her position stated 
there is basically that the authorities cited by Guardian are 
inapplicable and distinguishable upon their facts. That is, 
the law of wrongful death and third-party negligence should not 
be applied to a case involving fiduciaries under a deed of 
trust. However, even if this court should adopt the approach 
taken by the trial court; that is there is no negligence unless 
the forgery was foreseeable, Guardian is still liable to 
Wycalis. This is so because the nondelivery of the original 
note and trust deed with the request for reconveyance put 
Guardian on notice. This conclusion is supported by case law. 
In Koehn v. Central National Insurance Company, 354 P.2d 352 
(Kan. 1960), the court stated that notice "means intelligence 
by whatever means communicated, information, knowledge", 
Certainly, the absence of the original note and trust deed, 
which according to terms of the request for reconveyance were 
delivered with the request, but which m fact were not 
delivered with the request for reconveyance, put the trustee on 
notice. 
This position is consistent with the decision in Harvey v. 
Guaranty Trust Company, 134 Misc. 417, 236 N.Y.S. 37, affirmed 
256 N.Y. 526, 177 N.E. 126 (1929), in which the court addressed 
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the question of a trustee's liability where the trustee 
released the security under a trust deed without requiring 
presentation of all of the bonds secured. The court held that 
the absence of the bonds placed the trustee upon notice of the 
possibility that there might be outstanding bonds in the hands 
of persons entitled to enforce them. (Cited in 90 ALR2d at 
551.) 
Therefore, should this court elect to adopt the approach 
taken by the trial court, Guardian is still liable to Wycalis 
because Guardian was on notice by reason of the nondelivery of 
the original trust deed and note. 
B. The foreseeability of the criminal act is irrelevant to the 
case at bar because the criminal act was not the cause of 
Wycalis' loss. 
Cross Reference: 
Wycalis Brief Point V page 22 - 24; 
Guardian's Brief Point IV page 28 «06. 
Cuardian first argues that Wycalis is barred from advancing 
the arguments as to why the trial court erred in ruling that 
the trustee had no duty to foresee the criminal acts of 
others. It is Guardian's position that because the arguments 
were not made at the trial level, they should not be considered 
on appeal. (Guardian's Brief page 34.) The record is, 
however, clear and to the contrary. It has been Wycalis1 
position from the inception that Guardian's arguments 
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concerning the duty to foresee a criminal act are irrelevant to 
the issue before this court (Memorandum in Opposition to 
Summary Judgment Point II; R. 440). Further, it is clear from 
Guardian's memorandum that Guardian intended to rely upon the 
theory (Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, 
R. 388) and hence the trial court was fairly apprised of the 
theory and in fact relied upon the theory and its decision, 
(R. 520*522.) Therefore, the issue of the foreseeability of a 
criminal act is before this court and Wycalis is entitled to 
address that issue. (See Robinson Investment Company v. 
Greenrose Associates, 448 P.2d 440, Ariz. 1969.) 
As stated in Wycalis' Memorandum in Opposition to Summary 
Judgment (R. 440) the issue of the foreseeability of a criminal 
act is irrelevant to the case at bar and Guardian's reliance 
upon Scott v. Gray and §448 in the Restatement of Torts, Second 
is misplaced. As was stated at the trial level: 
Whether Guardian's acts were in good faith is of no concern 
here, nor are the assertions concerning the duty, or 
absence thereof, to foresee a criminal act. Plaintiff's 
claim against Guardian is not based upon a failure to act 
in good faith or for failing to foresee a criminal act, but 
rather, for negligence for failing to know, or failing to 
take reasonable steps to know, that the debt owed 
beneficiary had, prior to reconveyance, been paid. (R. 
440.) 
The reason for which the foreseeability of a criminal act 
is not an issue in this case is that the criminal act was not 
the cause of Wycalis' loss. It is stipulated that Wycalis lost 
her security when Guardian reconveyed the trust property. 
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(Guardian Statement of Undisputed Facts #8 and #14, Memorandum 
in Support of Motion of Guardian Title Company and Warren H. 
Curliss for Summary Judgment, R. 386, 387,) Wycalis suffered 
no loss by reason of the acts of the unknown forger, Wycalis' 
loss was occasioned by the acts, or omissions, of Guardian. As 
such, Guardian's reliance on the Scott decision is unwarranted 
because in that case the injuries were caused by the criminal 
act. Similarly, Guardianls reliance on §448 of the Restatement 
of Torts, Second is inappropriate because that section involves 
superseding causes. In the case at bar, the criminal act was 
not the cause of the loss. Therefore, §448 is not applicable. 
CONCLUSION 
The fundamental question for decision may be stated as 
follows: 
Upon receiving a request for reconveyance, what is 
required of a trustee of a deed of trust in order to 
protect the beneficiary's interest and to keep the trustee 
from liability? 
It is Wycalis' position that, whichever theory is adopted 
by this court, the exclusive reliance by the trustee upon a 
purportedly acknowledged request for reconveyance, without 
inquiry about, or delivery of, the original promissory note and 
trust deed, does not satisfy the fiduciary duty owed VJycalis by 
the trustee. This position is well supported in the case law 
of other jurisdictions and by four important policy 
considerations, considerations to which Guardian has made no 
response and therefore concedes. 
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Appellant Wycalis respectfully urges that the trial court 
erred in granting Guardian's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
requests that court's judgment be reversed. 
Dated: December H, 1986. 
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